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Gaussian Learning-Without-Recall in a Dynamic Social Network
Chu Wang1 and Bernard Chazelle2
Abstract— We analyze the dynamics of the Learning-
Without-Recall model with Gaussian priors in a dynamic social
network. Agents seeking to learn the state of the world, the
“truth”, exchange signals about their current beliefs across a
changing network and update them accordingly. The agents are
assumed memoryless and rational, meaning that they Bayes-
update their beliefs based on current states and signals, with
no other information from the past. The other assumption
is that each agent hears a noisy signal from the truth at a
frequency bounded away from zero. Under these conditions,
we show that the system reaches truthful consensus almost
surely with a convergence rate that is polynomial in expectation.
Somewhat paradoxically, high outdegree can slow down the
learning process. The lower-bound assumption on the truth-
hearing frequency is necessary: even infinitely frequent access
to the truth offers no guarantee of truthful consensus in the
limit.
I. INTRODUCTION
People typically form opinions by updating their cur-
rent beliefs and reasons in response to new signals from
other sources (friends, colleagues, social media, newspapers,
etc.) [1], [2], [3]. Suppose there were an information source
that made a noisy version of the “truth” available to agents
connected through a social network. Under which conditions
would the agents reach consensus about their beliefs? What
would ensure truthful consensus (meaning that the consensus
coincided with the truth)? How fast would it take for the
process to converge? To address these questions requires
agreeing on a formal model of distributed learning. Fully
rational agents update their beliefs by assuming a prior and
using Bayes’ rule to integrate all past information available to
them [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. Full rationality is intractable
in practice [10], [11], so much effort has been devoted to
developing computationally effective mechanisms, including
non- (or partially) Bayesian methods [12], [10], [3], [13],
[14]. Much of this line of work can be traced back to the
seminal work of DeGroot [15] on linear opinion pooling.
This paper is no exception. Specifically, it follows the
Bayesian-Without-Recall (BWR) model recently proposed by
Rahimian and Jadbabaie in [11]; see also [16], [17], [18].
The agents are assumed to be memoryless and rational:
this means that they use Bayesian updates based on current
beliefs and signals with no other information from the past.
The process is local in that agents can collect information
only from their neighbors in a directed graph. In this work,
the graph is allowed to change at each time step. The BWR
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model seeks to capture the benefits of rational behavior while
keeping both the computation and the information stored to
a minimum [18].
A distinctive feature of our work is that the social network
need not be fixed once and for all. The ability to modify
the communication channels over time reflects the inherently
changing nature of social networks as well as the reality
that our contacts do not all speak to us at once. Thus even
if the underlying network is fixed over long timescales,
the model allows for agents to be influenced by selected
subsets of their neighbors. Dynamic networks are common
occurrences in opinion dynamics [19], [20], [21], [22] but,
to our knowledge, somewhat new in the context of social
learning.
Our working model in this paper posits a Gaussian setting:
the likelihoods and initial priors of the agents are normal
distributions. During the learning process, signals are gener-
ated as noisy measurements of agents’ beliefs and the noise
is assumed normal and unbiased. Thus all beliefs remain
Gaussian at all times [11], [23].
Our main result is that, under the assumption that each
agent hears a noisy signal from the truth at a frequency
bounded away from zero, the system reaches truthful con-
sensus almost surely with a convergence rate polynomial in
expectation. Specifically, we show that, as long as each agent
receives a signal from the truth at least once every 1/γ steps,
the convergence rate is O(t−γ/2d), where d is the maximum
node outdegree.
Somewhat paradoxically, high outdegree can slow down
learning. The reason is that signals from peer agents are
imperfect conveyors of the truth and can, on occasion,
contaminate the network with erroneous information; this
finding is in line with a similar phenomenon uncovered
by Harel et al. [24], in which social learning system with
two Bayesian agents is found to be hindered by increased
interaction between the agents. We note that our lower-bound
assumption on the truth-hearing frequency is necessary: even
infinitely frequent access to the truth is not enough to achieve
truthful consensus in the limit.
Further background. Researchers have conducted empir-
ical evaluations of both Bayesian and non-Bayesian mod-
els [25], [26], [27], [28]. In [29], Mossel et al. analyzed a
Bayesian learning system in which each agent gets signals
from the truth only once at the beginning and then inter-
act with other agents using Gaussian estimators. In [30],
Moscarini et al. considered social learning in a model where
the truth is not fixed but is, instead, supplied by a Markov
chain. In the different but related realm of iterated learning,
agents learn from ancestors and teach descendants. The goal
is to pass on the truth through generations while seeking to
prevent information loss [31], [32].
Organization. Section II introduces the model and the
basic formulas for single-step belief updates. Section III
investigates the dynamics of the beliefs in expectation and
derive the polynomial upper bound on the convergence rate
under the assumption that each agent hears a signal from
the truth at a frequency bounded away from zero. We
demonstrate the necessity of this assumption in Section IV
and prove that the convergence occurs almost surely.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. The Model
We choose the real line R as the state space and we denote
the agents by 1, 2, . . . , n; for convenience, we add an extra
agent, labeled 0, whose belief is a fixed number, unknown
to others, called the truth. At time t = 0, 1, . . ., the belief of
agent i is a probability distribution over the state space R,
which is denoted by µt,i. We assume that the initial belief
µ0,i of agent i is Gaussian: µ0,i ∼ N (x0,i, σ20,i). Without
loss of generality, we assume the truth is a constant (single-
point distribution: µt,0 = 0; σt,0 = 0 for all t) and the
standard deviation is the same for all other agents, ie, σ0,i =
σ0 > 0 for i > 0.
The interactions between agents are modeled by an infinite
sequence (Gt)t≥0, where each Gt is a directed graph over
the node set {0, . . . , n}. An edge pointing from i to j in Gt
indicates that i receives data from j at time t. Typically, the
sequence of graphs is specified ahead of time or it is chosen
randomly: the only condition that matters is that it should be
independent of the randomness used in the learning process;
specifically, taking expectations and variances of the random
variables that govern the dynamics will assume a fixed graph
sequence (possibly random). Because agent 0 holds the truth,
no edge points away from it. The adjacency matrix of Gt is
denoted by At: it is an (n+1)× (n+1) matrix whose first
row is (1, 0, . . . , 0).
B. Information Transfer
At time t ≥ 0, each agent i > 0 samples a state
θt,i ∈ R consistent with her own belief: θt,i ∼ µt,i. A noisy
measurement at,i = θt,i + εt,i is then sent to each agent j
such that (At)ji = 1. All the noise terms εt,i are sampled iid
from N (0, σ2). An equivalent formulation is to say that the
likelihood function l(a|θ) is drawn from N (θ, σ2). In our
setting, agent i sends the same data to all of her neighbors;
this is done for notational convenience and the same results
would still hold if we were to resample independently for
each neighbor. Except for the omission of explicit utilities
and actions, our setting is easily identified as a variant of the
BWR model [11].
C. Updating Beliefs
A single-step update for agent i > 0 consists of setting
µt+1,i as the posterior P[µt,i|d] ∝ P[d|µt,i]P[µt,i], where d is
the data from the neighbors of i received at time t. Plugging
in the corresponding Gaussians gives us the classical update
rules from Bayesian inference [23]. Updated beliefs remain
Gaussian so we can use the notation µt,i ∼ N (xt,i, τ−1t,i ),
where τt,i denotes the precision σ−2t,i . Writing τ = σ−2 and
letting dt,i denote the outdegree of i in Gt, for any i > 0
and t ≥ 0,{
xt+1,i = (τt,ixt,i + τa1 + · · ·+ τadt,i)/(τt,i + dt,iτ);
τt+1,i = τt,i + dt,iτ,
(1)
where a1, . . . , adt,i are the signals received by agent i from
its neighbors at time t.
D. Expressing the Dynamics in Matrix Form
Let Dt and Pt denote the (n + 1)-by-(n + 1) diagonal
matrices diag(dt,i) and (τ0/τ)I +
∑t−1
k=0Dk, respectively,
where I is the identity matrix and the sum is 0 for t = 0. It
follows from (1) that µt,i ∼ N (xt,i, (τPt)−1ii ) for i > 0. Re-
grouping the means in vector form, xt := (xt,0, . . . , xt,n)T ,
where xt,0 = 0 and x0,1, . . . , x0,n are given as inputs, we
have
xt+1 = (Pt +Dt)
−1
(Ptxt +At (xt + ut + εt)) , (2)
where ut is such that ut,0 ∼ N (0, 0) and, for i > 0,
ut,i ∼ N (0, (τ(Pt)ii)−1); and εt is such that εt,0 ∼ N (0, 0)
and, for i > 0, εt,i ∼ N (0, 1/τ). We refer to the vectors
xt and yt := Ext as the mean process and the expected
mean process, respectively. Taking expectations on both sides
of (2) with respect to the random vectors ut and εt yields
the update rule for the expected mean process: y0 = x0 and,
for t > 0,
yt+1 = (Pt +Dt)
−1 (Pt +At) yt. (3)
A key observation is that (Pt +Dt)−1 (Pt +At) is a
stochastic matrix, so the expected mean process yt forms a
diffusive influence system [22]: the vector evolves by taking
convex combinations of its own coordinates. What makes
the analysis different from standard multiagent agreement
systems is that the weights vary over time. In fact, some
weights typically tend to 0, which violates one of the cardinal
assumptions used in the analysis of averaging systems [22],
[33]. This leads us to the use of arguments, such as fourth-
order moment bounds, that are not commonly encountered
in this area.
E. Our Results
The belief vector µt is Gaussian with mean xt and
covariance matrix Σt formed by zeroing out the top-left
element of (τPt)−1. We say that the system reaches truthful
consensus if both the mean process xt and the covariance
matrix tend to zero as t goes to infinity. This indicates that all
the agents’ beliefs share a common mean equal to the truth
and the “error bars” vanish over time. In view of (1), the
covariance matrix indeed tends to 0 as long as the degrees
are nonzero infinitely often, a trivial condition. To establish
truthful consensus, therefore, boils down to studying the
mean process xt. We do this in two parts: first, we show
that the expected mean process converges to the truth; then
we prove that fluctuations around it eventually vanish almost
surely.1
Truth-hearing assumption: Given any interval of length κ :=
⌊1/γ⌋, every agent i > 0 has an edge (i, 0) in Gt for at least
one value of t in that interval.
THEOREM 2.1: Under the truth-hearing assumption, the
system reaches truthful consensus with a convergence rate
bounded by O(t−γ/2d), where d is the maximum outdegree
over all the networks.
We prove the theorem in the next two sections. It will
follow directly from Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1 below. The con-
vergence rate can be improved to the order of t−(1−ε)γ/d,
for arbitrarily small ε > 0. The inverse dependency on γ
is not surprising: the more access to the truth the stronger
the attraction to it. On the other hand, it might seem
counterintuitive that a larger outdegree should slow down
convergence. This illustrates the risk of groupthink. It pays
to follow the crowds when the crowds are right. When they
are not, however, this distracts from the lonely voice that
happens to be right.
How essential is the truth-hearing assumption? We show
that it is necessary. Simply having access to the truth
infinitely often is not enough to achieve truthful consensus.
F. Useful Matrix Inequalities
We highlight certain matrix inequalities to be used
throughout. We use the standard element-wise notation R ≤
S to indicate that Rij ≤ Sij for all i, j. The infinity norm
‖R‖∞ = maxi
∑
j |rij | is submultiplicative: ‖RS‖∞ ≤
‖R‖∞‖S‖∞, for any matching rectangular matrices. On the
other hand, the max-norm ‖R‖max := maxi,j |rij | is not,
but it is transpose-invariant and also satisfies: ‖RS‖max ≤
‖R‖∞‖S‖max. It follows that
‖RSRT‖max≤ ‖R‖∞‖SR
T‖max = ‖R‖∞‖RS
T‖max
≤ ‖R‖2∞‖S
T ‖max = ‖R‖
2
∞‖S‖max.
(4)
III. THE EXPECTED MEAN PROCESS DYNAMICS
We analyze the convergence of the mean process in
expectation. The expected mean yt = Ext evolves through
an averaging process entirely determined by the initial value
y0 = (0, x0,1, . . . , x0,n)
T and the graph sequence Gt. Intu-
itively, if an agent communicates repeatedly with a holder
of the truth, the weight of the latter should accumulate and
1The Kullback-Leibler divergence [12] is not suitable here because the
estimator is Gaussian, hence continuous, whereas the truth is a single-point
distribution.
increasingy influence the belief of the agent in question. Our
goal in this section is to prove the following result:
LEMMA 3.1: Under the truth-hearing assumption, the ex-
pected mean process yt converges to the truth asymptotically.
If, at each step, no agent receives information from more than
d agents, then the convergence rate is bounded by Ct−γ/2d,
where C is a constant that depends on x0, γ, d, σ0/σ.
Proof. We define Bt as the matrix formed by removing
the first row and the first column from the stochastic
P−1t+1 (Pt +At). If we write yt as (0, zt) then, by (3),(
0
zt+1
)
=
(
1 0
αt Bt
)(
0
zt
)
, (5)
where αt,i = (P−1t+1)ii if there is an edge (i, 0) at time t and
αt,i = 0 otherwise. This further simplifies to
zt+1 = Btzt. (6)
Let 1 be the all-one column vector of length n. Since
P−1t+1 (Pt +At) is stochastic,
αt +Bt1 = 1 (7)
In matrix terms, the truth-hearing assumption means that, for
any t ≥ 0,
αt +αt+1 + · · ·+αt+κ−1 ≥ Q
−1
t+κ1, (8)
where Qt is the matrix derived from Pt by removing the first
row and the last column; the inequality relies on the fact that
Pt is monotonically nondecreasing. For any t > s ≥ 0, we
define the product matrix Bt:s defined as
Bt:s := Bt−1Bt−2 . . . Bs, (9)
with Bt:t = I . By (6), for any t > s ≥ 0,
zt = Bt:s zs. (10)
To bound the infinity norm of Bt:0, we observe that, for any
0 ≤ l < κ − 1, the i-th diagonal element of Bs+κ:s+l+1 is
lower-bounded by
κ−1∏
j=l+1
(Bs+j)ii =
κ−1∏
j=l+1
(Ps+j +As+j)ii
(Ps+j+1)ii
(11)
≥
κ−1∏
j=l+1
(Ps+j)ii
(Ps+j+1)ii
=
(Ps+l+1)ii
(Ps+κ)ii
≥
(Ps)ii
(Ps+κ)ii
.
The inequalities follow from the nonnegativity of the entries
and the monotonicity of (Pt)ii. Note that (11) also holds for
l = κ− 1 since (Bs+κ:s+κ)ii = 1.
Since P−1t+1 (Pt +At) is stochastic, the row-sum of Bt
does not exceed 1; therefore, by premultiplymultiplying
Bs+1, Bs+1, . . . on both sides of (7), we obtain:
Bs+κ:s1 ≤ 1−
κ−1∑
l=0
Bs+κ:s+l+1αs+l. (12)
Noting that ‖Bt‖∞ = ‖Bt1‖∞ for any t, as Bt is non-
negative, we combine (8), (11), and (12) together to derive:
‖Bs+κ:s‖∞ ≤ 1−min
i>0
(Ps)ii
(Ps+κ)2ii
. (13)
Let d := maxt≥0 max1≤i≤n dt,i denote the maximum outde-
gree in all the networks, and define δ = min{τ0/τ, 1}. For
any i > 0 and s ≥ κ,
sδ
κ
≤ (Ps)ii ≤ ds+
τ0
τ
; (14)
hence,
max
i
(Ps+κ)ii ≤ d(s+ κ) +
τ0
τ
. (15)
It follows that
(Ps+κ)ii − (Ps)ii
(Ps+κ)ii
=
∑κ−1
l=0 ds+l,i
(Ps+κ)ii
≤
dκ2δ−1
s+ κ
. (16)
Thus, we have
min
i>0
(Ps)ii
(Ps+κ)ii
= 1−max
i>0
(Ps+κ)ii − (Ps)ii
(Ps+κ)ii
≥ 1−
dκ2δ−1
s+ κ
.
(17)
We can replace the upper bound of (13) by
1−
1
maxi>0(Ps+κ)ii
min
i>0
(Ps)ii
(Ps+κ)2ii
,
which, together with (15) and (17) gives us
‖Bs+κ:s‖∞ ≤ 1−
1
d(s+ κ) + τ0/τ
(
1−
dκ2δ−1
s+ κ
)
≤ 1−
1
2dκ(m+ 2)
.
(18)
The latter inequality holds as long as s = mκ > 0 and
m ≥ m∗ :=
2dκ
δ
+
τ0
dκτ
.
It follows that, for m0 ≥ m∗,
‖B(m0+m)κ:m0κ‖∞ ≤
m+1∏
j=2
(
1−
1
2dκ(m0 + j)
)
≤ exp

− 12dκ
m+1∑
j=2
1
m0 + j

 .
(19)
The matrices Bt are sub-stochastic so that
‖Bt z‖∞ ≤ ‖Bt‖∞‖z‖∞ ≤ ‖z‖∞.
By (10), for any t ≥ (m0 +m)κ,
zt = Bt:(m0+m)κB(m0+m)κ:m0κ zm0 ,
so that, by using standard bounds for the harmonic series,
ln(k + 1) < 1 + 12 + · · ·+
1
k ≤ 1 + ln k, we find that
‖zt‖∞ ≤ ‖B(m0+m)κ:m0κ zm0‖∞
≤ ‖B(m0+m)κ:m0κ‖∞‖z0‖∞
≤ Ct−1/(2dκ),
where C > 0 depends on z0, κ, d, τ0/τ . We note that the
convergence rate can be improved to the order of t−(1−ε)γ/d,
for arbitrarily small ε > 0, by working a little harder
with (18). 
IV. THE MEAN PROCESS DYNAMICS
Recall that µt,i ∼ N (xt,i, τ−1t,i ), where τt,i denotes the
precision σ−2t,i . A key observation about the updating rule
in (1) is that the precision τt,i is entirely determined by
the graph sequence Gt and is independent of the actual
dynamics. Adding to this the connectivity property implied
by the truth-hearing assumption, we find immediately that
τt,i → ∞ for any agent i. This ensures that the covariance
matrix Σt tends to 0 as t goes to infinity, which satisfies the
second criterion for truthful consensus. The first criterion
requires that the mean process xt should converge to the
truth 0. Take the vector xt − yt and remove the first
coordinate (xt − yt)0 to form the vector ∆t ∈ Rn. Under
the truth-hearing assumption, we have seen that yt → 0
(Lemma 3.1), so it suffices to prove the following:
LEMMA 4.1: Under the truth-hearing assumption, the de-
viation ∆t vanishes almost surely.
Proof. We use a fourth-moment argument. The justification
for the high order is technical: it is necessary to make a
certain “deviation power” series converge. By (2), xt is a
linear combination of independent Gaussian random vectors
us and εs for 0 ≤ s ≤ t−1, and thus xt itself is a Gaussian
random vector. Therefore ∆t is also Gaussian and its mean
is zero. From Markov’s inequality, for any c > 0,
∑
t≥0
P[|∆t,i| ≥ c] ≤
∑
t≥0
E∆4t,i
c4
. (20)
If we are able to show the right hand side of (20) is finite
for any c > 0, then, by the Borel-Cantelli lemma, with
probability one, the event |∆t,i| ≥ c occurs only a finite
number of times, and so ∆t,i goes to zero almost surely.
Therefore, we only need to analyze the order of the fourth
moment E∆4t,i. By subtracting (3) from (2), we have:
∆t+1 = Bt∆t +Mtvt, (21)
where vt := ut + εt and Mt := P−1t+1At; actually, for
dimensions to match, we remove the top coordinate of vt
and the first row and first column of Mt (see previous section
for definition of Bt). Transforming the previous identity into
a telescoping sum, it follows from ∆0 = x0 − y0 = 0 and
the definition Bt:s = Bt−1Bt−2 . . . Bs that
∆t =
t−1∑
s=0
Bt:s+1Msvs =
t−1∑
s=0
Rt,svs, (22)
where Rt,s := Bt:s+1Ms. We denote by C1, C2, . . . suit-
ably large constants (possibly depending on κ, d, n, τ, τ0).
By (14), ‖Ms‖∞ ≤ C1/(s+1) and, by (19), for sufficiently
large s,
‖Bt:s+1‖∞ ≤ C2(s+ 1)
β(t+ 1)−β ,
where β = 1/2dκ < 1. Combining the above inequalities,
we obtain the following estimate of Rt,s as
‖Rt,s‖∞ ≤ C3(s+ 1)
−1+β(t+ 1)−β. (23)
In the remainder of the proof, the power of a vector is
understood element-wise. We use the fact that vs and vs′
are independent if s 6= s′ and that the expectation of an odd
power of an unbiased Gaussian is always zero. By Cauchy-
Schwarz and Jensen’s inequalities,
E∆
4
t =
(
t−1∑
s=0
Rt,svs
)4
=
t−1∑
s=0
E(Rt,svs)
4 +
∑
0≤s6=s′<t
3E(Rt,svs)
2
E(Rt,s′vs′)
2
≤
t−1∑
s=0
E(Rt,svs)
4 + 3
(
t−1∑
s=0
E(Rt,svs)
2
)2
≤
t−1∑
s=0
E(Rt,svs)
4 + 3t
t−1∑
s=0
E
2(Rt,svs)
2
≤ (3t+ 1)
t−1∑
s=0
E(Rt,svs)
4. (24)
Notice that since the variance of vt = (vt,1, . . . , vt,n)T is
nonincreasing, there exists a constant C4 such that E v4t,i ≤
C4. By Jensen’s inequality and the fact that the variables vt,i
are independent for different values of i, we have, for any
i, j, k, l,
|E vt,ivt,jvt,kvt,l| ≤ max
k
E v4t,k.
By direct calculation, it then follows that
max
i
E(Rt,svs)
4
i = max
i
E
( n∑
j=1
(Rt,s)ijvs,j
)4
≤ max
i
( n∑
j=1
(Rt,s)i,j
)4
max
k
E v4s,k
= ‖Rt,s‖
4
∞max
k
E v4s,k
≤ C5(s+ 1)
−4+4β(t+ 1)−4β. (25)
Summing (25) over 0 ≤ s ≤ t − 1, we conclude from (24)
that E∆4t ≤ C6t−2, and thus∑
t≥0
E∆
4
t ≤ C6
∑
t≥1
t−2 ≤ C7. (26)
By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, it follows that ∆t vanishes
almost surely. 
Theorem 2.1 follows directly from Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1.

We now show why the truth-hearing assumption is nec-
essary. We describe a sequence of graphs Gt that allows
every agent infinite access to the truth and yet does not lead
to truthful consensus. For this, it suffices to ensure that the
expected mean process yt does not converge. Consider a
system with two learning agents with priors µ0,1 and µ0,2
from the same distribution N (2, 1). We have x0,1 = x0,2 =
y0,1 = y0,2 = 2 and, as usual, the truth is assumed to be
0; the noise variance is σ2 = 1. The graph sequence is
defined as follows: set t1 = 0; for k = 1, 2, . . ., agent 1
links to the truth agent at time tk and to agent 2 at times
tk+1, . . . , sk− 1; then at time sk, agent 2 links to the truth
agent, and then to agent 1 at times sk+1, . . . , tk+1−1. The
time points sk and tk are defined recursively to ensure that
ysk,1 ≥ 1 + 2
−2k+1 and ytk,2 ≥ 1 + 2−2k. (27)
In this way, the expected mean processes of the two agents
alternate while possibly sliding down toward 1 but never
lower. The existence of these time points can be proved by
induction. Since y0,2 = 2, the inequality ytk,2 ≥ 1 + 2−2k
holds for k = 1, so let’s assume it holds up to k > 0. The
key to the proof is that, by (3), as agent 1 repeatedly links
to agent 2, she is pulled arbitrarily close to it. Indeed, the
transition rule gives us
yt+1,1 =
(Pt)11
(Pt+1)11
yt,1 +
1
(Pt+1)11
yt,2,
where (Pt+1)11 = (Pt)11 + 1, which implies that yt,1 can
be brought arbitrarily close to yt,2 while the latter does not
move: this follows from the fact that any product of the form∏tb
t>ta
t
t+1 tends to 0 as tb grows.
2
It follows that a suitably increasing sequence of sk, tk
ensures the two conditions (27). The beliefs of the two agents
do not converge to the truth even though they link to the truth
agent infinitely often.
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